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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper was to increase understanding of how foreign 
professionals within the diplomatic sector, working with foreign relations to 
Japan, feel, perceive and relate to Japanese nationalism. The concept of banal 
nationalism and semiology was used as a theoretical base for the study, as well as 
theories of Japanese cultural or racial uniqueness (Nihonjinron). A 
phenomenological method was used, allowing the informant’s own interpretation 
to be discovered. Interviews were made with foreign relations professionals in 
Tokyo. The results showed that the informants interpreted the word ‘nationalism’ 
to represent the form of behaviour and ideas associated with right-wing groups. 
The informants views on Japanese society and culture (cultural nationalism) 
showed them viewing Japan as a hierarchical society with honest individuals; very 
much influenced by an “island country mentality”. The informants did not see 
their decision-making influenced by Japanese nationalism. However, it was 
uncovered that to some influence were excreted over the informant’s decisions via 
cultural nationalism. 
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1 Introduction 
Nationalism as a belief system, ideology and political movement has had, and continues 
to have a great impact on the contemporary world. The word "nationalism" is usually 
used to describe a passionate ideology striving to achieve autonomy, cohesion and/or 
independence, by trying to create a nation state, or threaten the stability of existing 
states.  
Examples of nationalism can be found within separatist- and right-wing movements, 
both rather rare, exotic and often violent. As a phenomenon and ideology, it constitutes 
an idea of how the world is divided into different communities, thus being both 
normative and a result of global processes (Halliday, 2006:521). And although 
nationalisms, and thus the nations (not states) they create tend to regard themselves as 
unique and primordial, this is many times just a figment of imagination in describing the 
imagined community that constitutes the nation (Anderson, 2003).  
Japan does stand out to some extent in that the sheer amount of thought and media 
dedicated to Japanese "uniqueness" is quite extensive, and thus regardless of whether 
Japan is truly unique in the realities of sociology or psychology, the sheer volume of 
media arguing in favour of Japanese uniqueness is quite unique (Sugimoto, 2003:2). 
Especially influential is the writing of Nihonjinron1 with the (honne2) goal of promoting 
the image of a unique and homogenous Japan (Sugimoto, 2003:32); a genre which has 
come to spread and influence almost every aspect of modern Japanese culture 
(Shepherd, 1991:187).  And like other forms of cultural nationalism like Asian values 
appear to flourish after a significant level of economic maturity (Sugimoto, 2003:18).  
Although one can also find right-wing groups in Japan, a more popular (soto3) image 
of Japanese society – amongst foreigners – is one of mega-corporations (Sugimoto, 
2003:86), lifetime employment, workaholic, job dedication, company loyalty and group 
orientation (Sugimoto, 2003:110). This can be attributed to the individuals occupying 
elite positions in large companies and society, with greater mass media access, and a 
thus hegemonic position, setting the norms of lifestyle and values, which are reflected in 
studies on Japanese society and people4 (Sugimoto, 2003:2).  
In contemporary Japans mainstream political life, a slight surge of nationalism could 
be found (Tanaka, 2007); for example visits made to the Yasakuni shrine5 by high level 
                                               
1  日本人論  (n) - theories of Japanese cultural or racial uniqueness. 
2  本音(n) - real intention; motive. 
3  外 (n) - outside; exterior. 
4 The average Japanese is a woman (51%), working in a small firm with less than 300 employees (78%), 
non-unionised (79%) and no university background, except perhaps from junior or technical collage 
(85%) (Sugimoto, 2003:2). Thus the average lifestyle and values of the Japanese people are more 
heterogeneous than might be suggested by many studies. In reality, generation, geography and socio-
economic factors are influential in generating different lifestyles, housing, eating habits, language 
(dialects), style of thinking and many other aspects of every day life (Sugimoto:60). 
5. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4348280.stm (2008-05-24, 04:23) 
 4 
 
officials (for instance ex-prime minister Koizumi), former prime minister Abe’s vision 
of a Beautiful country6 as well as the textbook controversy7, the new educational 
reform8, placing emphasis on patriotism in the classroom and the work of changing 
Japans pacifist constitution9. 
The question of Japanese nationalism could be viewed from different vantage points; 
from a Japanese, and thus more internal perspective, or from an external that is of an 
outsider that comes in contact with the phenomenon, either through daily and personal 
life in Japan or through professional contacts.  
This study is focused on an external perspective and on professionals within the 
diplomatic sector. An interesting question would thus be how nationalism could affect 
the way in how these professionals (of countries and trading partners) perceive the 
phenomenon of Japanese nationalism, and how they feel and act in relation to it. How 
are professional diplomats affected by Japanese nationalism? Can nationalism effect the 
decision making process of foreign agents working in the diplomatic sector? Do they 
believe themselves to give Japanese nationalism special consideration, or do they 
believe they have to? Do peoples own nationalism, or view of nationalism as a 
phenomenon, play a role? In short, how do they relate and feel about being exposed to 
Japanese nationalism? 
From a theoretical perspective there are a number of theories on nations and 
nationalism that offers possible explanations to the phenomenon as such. Theoretical 
schools such as primordialism, modernism, ethno-symbolism and the theory of banal 
nationalism are noteworthy. The first three are in comparison to the last, umbrella 
names for a number of theories with similar characteristics. 
Primordialist theories see nations and nationalism as a naturally occurring 
phenomenon, or as something inherited though the generations, meanwhile the 
modernist school primarily focus on how nationalism and nations have come to being 
through the modernization of society. Ethno-symbolism is centered on the ethnic bonds 
and sentiment in the creation of nations (Özkirimli, 2000).  
In the theory of banal nationalism there is a focus on the symbols that propagate and 
symbolise the nation, when in fact it already has come into being. These symbols can 
previously have been displayed consciously, but also melded into the background 
environment that constitutes the homeland. These symbols represent the national 
identity and create the stereotypical images that separate “us” from “them”, including 
the stereotypical image of “our” homeland (Billig, 1995:19). Words like “we” and 
“them” thus play a role, and the theory is therefore interesting to use in relation to how 
the “them” [foreigners] inside the Japanese homeland, see the “us” [Japanese]. 
The theoretical orientation towards stereotypes and symbols, and their importance for 
cultures as the carrier for national identities, can also be found within the field of 
communications theory. Within this area of study, one can note two major schools. On 
the one side there are those who see communication as the transmission of information 
                                               
6. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5391132.stm (2008-05-24, 04:25) 
7. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4724669.stm (2008-05-24, 04:26), (Buruman, 1995) 
8. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6669061.stm (2008-05-24, 04:27) 
9. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6652809.stm (2008-05-24, 04:27) 
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from a sender to a receiver, where as the other sees communication as the creation and 
interchange of meaning. In the later case there is a focus on how the message/text 
interplay with humans in order to create meaning; in other words it deals with the 
texts/symbols role in culture. This later field of study is called semiology (the 
knowledge of signs and meaning) (Fiske, 1990). 
According to Fiske (1990) there are three main areas for semiological studies: The 
sign in it self, the codes and systems, and the culture in which they are active in.  It is 
more specifically the codes and systems, as well as the cultures that are of interest and 
relevance in this study. When studying the codes and cultures, a certain interest is 
focused on the way in which codes develop/evolve in order to fit a societies/cultures 
requirements, alternatively to fit the channels that are available for communication. 
From a semiological perspective, concepts such as myth, symbol and ideology are 
central as the carriers of cultures content. The cultures signs thus become the form of 
expression for the banal nationalism. 
The following research question summarizes the discussion in the introduction; how 
do professionals within the diplomatic sector, working with foreign relations to Japan, 
feel, perceive and relate to Japanese nationalism? 
1.1 Purpose 
The starting point for this paper lies in the theories of banal nationalism and semiology, 
with the focus on symbols as a bearer and transmitter of culture. Thus, the purpose of 
this paper is to increase understanding of how foreign professionals within the 
diplomatic sector, working with foreign relations to Japan, feel, perceive and relate to 
Japanese nationalism. 
1.2 Restrictions 
Since the area of study is large I will focus on personnel working at diplomatic 
missions, more specifically diplomats, originating from EU member states. For practical 
reasons a limited number of people will be interviewed. The research will study the 
perspective of the people interviewed.  
The interviews will be restricted in time to the period of my internship in Japan (July 
to December 2007). 
Because of the language barrier it will not be possible to undertake interviews in any 
other language than those I am fluent in (English and Swedish). 
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1.3 Disposition 
This thesis was to be structured according to IMRAD (Introduction, Method, Result, 
Analysis and Discussion), developed by the American National Standard Institute. 
However. some modifications have been made to this; The theory chapter has been 
extracted from the introduction and is placed in its own chapter before the methods 
chapter and the Analysis chapter has been omitted since this is a descriptive study 
(Hansemark, 2008). In the introduction the theme of the study and its purpose has been 
presented. In the following chapter on theory, banal nationalism, semiology and 
Nihonjinron is presented as well as an research overview. The chapter on Method is 
structured with an introduction to the meta-scientific base of the study, followed by a 
presentation of the more technical details of the study. The results are then presented in 
its own chapter with an analysis in the subsequent chapter. The ending chapter will 
contain a discussion with suggestions for future research. 
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2 Theory 
2.1 Banal Nationalism 
Normally, the word "nationalism" is used by scholars to describe the passionate 
nationalism that manifest itself during extreme conditions, limited timeframe and in 
extreme forms. That the national identity of a nation, and thus the nation itself survives 
after its conception is often largely, if not completely, overlooked by scholars of 
"society"10, especially when studying nationalism (Billig, 1995:43). Billig rejects this 
orthodox view of nationalism and asserts that it must have its roots in people's mundane 
everyday life (Billig, 1995:41). But the symbols of the nation are perceived 
unconsciously rather than consciously (Billig, 1995:41). ”[The] image of banal 
nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion: it is the 
flag hanging unnoticed on the public building” (Billig, 1995:8). 
One of several national symbols that Billig brings up is the flag. The "national flag" 
symbolize the holy character of the nation: it is revered by loyal citizens and ritually 
stained by they who want to protest (Ibid.:41). It is a focal point for national sentiments 
(Ibid.:39). And as an (international) ideology, nationalism makes a world of nations 
seem completely natural, even in present day democracies. ”It is as if democracy today, 
knows no other home, no other grounding, except national homelands.” (Billig, 
1995:97) 
When it comes to national identities, a banal, far from harmless routine is needed in 
order for passionate nationalism to be able to emerge. However, it is not a psychological 
tool, or like a cell phone, which mostly lies dormant, until a crisis occurs; "big 
brother"11 calls; and the patriotic12 identity is connected. In order for a national identity 
to "work", there has to be an understanding and opinion of what this identity is. Thus, 
stereotypes are created in order to distinguish "them" from "us", with "us" being the 
norm, in comparison to "their" deviations. The geographical territory is also connected 
to a stereotyped "homeland" (Özkirimli, 2000:200f). In the sports news13, reverberations 
                                               
10 Billig also means that scholars of sociology (the knowledge and science about society) do not reflect 
about the fact that "society" is actually synonymous with "nation" (Billig 1995:53) 
11 Here symbolizing "the great leader of the nation”, if it is a monarch that is elected or not varies. 
12 Patriotism is actually synonymous with nationalism, but is used for rhetorical purposes. It is possible 
for nationalism to be projected onto others, and then often described as (passionately) irrationally 
dangerous, superfluous and foreign. Patriotism ("our" nationalism) on the other hand is both defended and 
celebrated, and describes as something necessary and beneficial (Billig 1995:55) 
13 The author has to admit that he never read the sports pages or watches the sports news. 
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can be found of banal stereotypes like nation, place and race – not to mention 
masculinity (Özkirimli, 2000:119f). 
Language also generates a banal nationalism, with "small words, rather than 
grandiose and memorable phrases", "we" are reminded of who "we" and "they" are. 
Words like "we", "this" and "here" thus get to play a very big role (Billig 1995:94), 
something that particularly politicians and journalists regularly use in their rhetoric, 
more or less consciously. 
Moreover, just like a language dies because of the lack of regular users, so to a 
nation has to be used on a daily basis (Billig 1995:95). However, it is not through their 
power of political office that they generate a banal nationalism; but their influence as a 
representative for the nation, and the regular banalization given by their exposure in 
mass media (Özkirimli 2000:201). For politicians, nationalism is a standard 
tool/strategy when they speak for or to the "people" (Billig 1995:99f), sometimes even 
in a way as thou they were holding a mirror in which the nation could admire itself 
(Ibid., s.98).  
2.2 Semiology 
Humans are very communicative, with an inherent interest in signs. Every cultural 
pattern and every action of social behaviour includes communication in one way or 
another. Even if the verbal language is central, the meaning of artefacts and processes in 
human culture can also be central (Copley 2000:3). Even every conversational action 
can include the transmitting of messages through gestures, posture, clothing, haircut, 
etc., which in themselves transmit communicative signals. Even when we are quiet or 
spoken to, messages will be transmitted and heard through other "languages", for 
example laws that hinder, billboards that proclaim, smells that attract or repel, even with 
the "feeling" of objects communicate something meaningful to us (Hawkes 1997:124f). 
Semiology (also known as semiotics) is the study of how the sign in itself (and 
variants of the sign) transmit meaning, as well as how they stand in relation to the user 
(Hawkes 1997:123). A sign is something that represents something for someone, in one 
way or another (Hawkes 1997:126). In principle, semiology is used to show what makes 
up a sign, and which laws that govern them (Hawkes 1997:123). The sign is something 
physical that can be perceived by our senses, but what the sign refers to is created as a 
model for meaning by its users (Fiske 1990:61f). The mental conception is however a 
cultural product and thus in large part common for the members within a culture that 
uses the same language (system of signs). Thus, it is not necessarily certain that the 
meaning in an original text or message, will agree completely with the meaning in a 
translation from one language to another. (ibid.:66f).  
According to Fiske (1990:60ff) there are three main areas14 for semiological studies: 
The sign in itself, codes and systems as well as the cultures in which they are active. 
                                               
14 Semiology can however also be seen as a wider research area, with separate sub-areas such as 
zoosimilogy, where the communicative behaviour of other animals than humans are studies, proxemics 
(human body communication), smell-sign, aesthetic theory and rhetoric (Hawkes 1997:124). 
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The continued description of this theory chapter will constrain itself to codes and 
systems as well as culture, since the sign in itself is not of relevance for this study. 
Codes are systems in which signs have been organized, and occur in two categories: 
behavioural codes and signifying codes: Behavioural codes constitute codes of law and 
other rules for behaviour. Signifying codes15 are constituted by sign systems. Seen from 
a codes and system perspective, signs are organised the way they are since a number of 
codes have develop and evolve in order to suit the demands of a society/culture, or the 
channels that are available for communication. 
Codes can also be categorized as developed (expressing the abstract, the common, 
the absent) or limited (the concrete, the specific, that which is happening here and now). 
Pop art (low culture16) and similar users of limited codes contribute, according to Fiske 
(1990) in a larger extent to the creation of group cohesion and solidarity by contributing 
with common experiences than for instance an opera (high culture17) or similar users of 
developed codes does. Codes can also be seen as broad or narrow, with broad codes 
being socially oriented and tend to appeal to what people have in common and thus 
contribute to the group cohesion and solidarity within a society. The broad codes are the 
means with which the culture communicates with itself (Fiske 1990:103). These 
messages then return to the culture where they had their origin and give nourishment to 
its thought- and emotional pattern (Fiske 1990:104). Narrow codes on the other hand 
are only directed to a certain group that is often defined by the codes that it uses. The 
culture within which codes and signs are active is also object for semiological studies. If 
the cultures signs and codes are not used the cultures form and existence is threatened. 
A culture thus requires that its member participate actively with these communicative 
codes in order for it to be an active, dynamic and living organism. Meaning is created 
when text and audience cooperate, and both elements are regarded as contributing equal 
as much. When a text and an audience are members in a snugly consistent culture or 
subculture the cooperation is done smoothly and relaxed: connotations and myths that 
texts use overlap, if not exactly, then very well with the audience (Fiske 1990:217). 
Codes and conventions make up the core of every culture experiences and make it 
possible for its members to orientate themselves within the culture and understand the 
social existence that comes with it. Through common codes membership of a culture 
can be experienced and expressed (Fiske 1990:114). Three concepts: symbol, myth and 
ideology are central in the understanding of how cultures function. A symbol is an 
object that through convention and usage has received a meaning which enables it to 
represent something else (Fiske 1990:125). A symbol (for example a flag) can activate a 
myth, or a chain of concepts that are contained within a myth (Fiske 1990:121). A myth 
is a way for a culture to explain, perceive or mentally process (put into words or 
comprehend) a certain aspect of reality. Myths can be divided into two groups: 
primitive myths (about life and death, humans and gods, good and evil) and 
sophisticated myths (about masculinity and femininity, family, success and science) 
(Fiske 1990:121). Fiske also notes that myths are a product of one group within society 
that has become dominant, which is reflected in the myths. Myths mystify or cloud their 
                                               
15 If nothing else is said, then these kind of codes will be the kind of codes that will be discussed in this 
theoretical summary. 
16 i.e. Manga, television dramas and idol contests etc. 
17 i.e. Ikebana (flower arrangement), kabuki theatre, and ukiyo-e (a type of woodblock prints) etc. 
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origin in order to reduce, or remove, the political or social dimension they have. Thus, 
they try to appear as natural, and not as socially or historically conditioned (Fiske 
1990:122). Common myths and signs enable cultural identification, which results in that 
membership can be attained by acknowledge the common myths and values that are 
found within the culture (Fiske 1990:226). 
Ideology is a system of conceptions that are characteristic for a certain group or 
community, where illusionary conceptions – false ideas or false insights – can be 
compared to true or scientific knowledge (Fiske 1990:218). Codes are also dependent of 
an agreement between users and a common cultural background (frame of reference) 
when codes and culture have a dynamic and joint relation. The codes also perform an 
identifiable social and communicating function, which requires the codes to be able to 
be transferred through suitable mediums and/or channels of communication (Fiske 
1990:92).  
In a world where communication is central, mass media plays an important role in 
the creation and perception of meaning. The receiver of these messages is seen as an 
active reader, since reading is something we learn, and thus affected by cultural 
experiences as well. The significance of a text is thus also created with the help of the 
reader through the aid and influence of his or her attitude, emotions and previous 
experiences. Mass media have thus the possibility to activate the readers' awareness. 
They invite the reader to assume a certain identity in order to be able to decode what the 
message that mass media is projecting in accordance with the dominating code (or 
arrive at a meaning that the mass medium itself is benefiting). The receiver and message 
together produce the benefiting meaning, and this makes the receiver someone with a 
certain set of relation to the dominating value system and to the rest of society (Fiske 
1990:218).  
From a semiologic perspective, notions like myth, symbol and ideology are central as 
carriers of cultural content. The cultures signs thus become forms of expression for the 
banal nationalism.  
2.3 Research overview 
Tamamoto (2001) deals with a number of issues relating to Japanese nationalism, in 
particular the Yasakuni shrine and the Japanese constitution. It does however draw lines 
between nationalism and patriotism (and jingoism) as well as arguing that constitutional 
revision will not lead to a resurgence of patriotism. The end note is, like that title 
suggests, that Japan is not a country of patriots. 
Matthews (2003) deals with what he labels as a rebirth of Japanese nationalism is 
discussed. With a short historical contextualization, it informs the reader that various 
bizarre nationalist positions are no longer considered as taboo in mainstream politics 
(i.e. nuclear weapons etc.), and that domestic and economic trends have made the 
Japanese population more aggressive-minded. The author also warns about foreigners 
overlooking real sources of contemporary Japanese nationalism. To this he also 
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highlights economic aspects on nationalism and how economic reform was crucial in 
the blossoming of Japanese nationalism in the 1920’s and 30’s. 
Of the roughly 900 right-wing groups (uyoku dantai), with roughly 10000 members, 
that exists in Tokyo, more than half are fronts for organized crime (yakuza). With their 
political value base of anti-communist, anti-American and ultra-nationalist, a common 
way to get the messages across it to blare it from the speakers on their (black) vans 
(Economist, No8529, 2007:63). 
The question of the Diet (Japanese Lower House) is in focus as it has approved the 
flag and anthem, with the public reaction; also noting that the Japanese government is 
taking steps to support the Japanese identity (Christian Science Monitor, 1999-07-23:1). 
Gijerde (2001) argues that researchers of attachment have neglected cultural issues, 
and criticizes Rothbaum et al. and the idea that Japan is "uniquely unique" which have 
given rise to Nihonjinron. The core of "Japaneseness" is said to have been discussed by 
both Japanese and foreign scholars for decades, and various attributes (e.g. language, 
race, values, and personality traits and dispositions such as amae18) have been woven 
into a cohesive cultural ideology. 
There is speculations that the rise in nationalistic sentiment in Japan and China 
during the 1980s and 1990s may lead to potential conflicts between the two is 
questioned. It identifies similar trends in campaigns by elites in both countries to raise 
patriotic sentiment during the period, with failing results. On the other hand  “cultural 
nationalism” is said to have managed better, but in either case the types of nationalistic 
surge that have emerged is also said to have been predominantly inward-oriented 
responses to domestic and external changes. Thus the conclusion is that relations 
between China and Japan are relatively stable (Rose, 2000). 
Sasada (2006) writes that there are signs of a shift from Japans traditional postwar 
pacifism to more hotter forms of nationalism, with opinion polls suggesting a particular 
increase amongst youth; Something that may change the dynamics of international 
[interstate?] relations in East Asia. The aims of the article is to examine several factors 
that is contributing to the shift, including the global context (with for instance Chinas 
and the two Koreas posture and national sentiment towards Japan), media and 
intellectuals, the decline of leftist parties (because of political blunders, increasing the 
trust voters have in the conservatives), increasing popularity of nationalist manga19 
(propagating views of conservative and right-wing intellectuals), Internet (since media 
is seen as biased and self-censoring), and international sporting events. 
National attitudes among Japanese citizens are examined by Karasawa  (2002). His 
study was conducted by developing a National Identity Scale and administering it to 
nearly a thousand Japanese people (n=971) in metropolitan Japan. One of several 
findings was that commitment to national heritage was linked to conservatism, whereas 
a internationalism was linked to liberalism, high media exposure and knowledge of 
international affairs. 
                                               
18 甘え(n) - depending on other's kindness 
19  漫画 (n) – Japanese comic; cartoon 
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2.4 Japanese Society, Culture and Nationalism 
A popular (soto) image of Japan – amongst foreigners - is one of mega-corporations 
(Sugimoto, 2003:86), lifetime employment, workaholism, job dedication, company 
loyalty and group orientation (Sugimoto, 2003:110). This can be attributed to the 
individuals occupying elite positions in large companies and society, with greater mass 
media access, and a thus hegemonic position, setting the norms of lifestyle and values, 
which are reflected in studies on Japanese society and people20 (Sugimoto, 2003:2). 
Especially influential is the writing of Nihonjinron with the honne goal of promoting the 
image of a unique an homogenous Japan and its people (Sugimoto, 2003:32), and which 
has come to spread and influence almost every aspect of modern Japanese culture 
(Shepherd, 1991:187). 
2.4.1 Nihonjinron 
In the same way that German intellectuals debated "What is German?" in the 19th 
century, so to Japanese thinking elites today are asking and shaping the answer to the 
question of "What is Japanese?" (Yoshino,1992:5). The contemporary strand of 
nihonjinron (theories/discussions on the Japanese) which strives to describe the 
essential qualities of Japaneseness, can be traced to have its historical roots in the 
propaganda of Imperial Japan during the pacific war; also known as the Greater East 
Asia War (Goldstein-Gidoni, 2005:157 and 173, Slater, 2003:276 and Shepherd, 
1991:187). It also forms a cohesive cultural ideology (cultural nationalism), promoted 
by the conservative political elite; or as Prime minister Yoshiro Mori put it "[Japan] is a 
divine country with the emperor at its center" (Gjerde – Onishi,  2000:216). 
With nihonjinron being an extremely popular genre, produced and consumed in 
enormous quantities (text, visual etc.) both by local Japanese, and foreigners, it can be 
said that its wide penetration into society enables it to function as a common frame of 
reference for many Japanese (Haugh, 1998:29 and Goldstein-Gidoni, 2005:157). Given 
this, nihonjinron can also be justified as being a cultural system or -model, not just a 
scholarly discourse (Slater, 2003:277). In addition, the ideology can arguably also be 
said to be driven by the professional elite21 enjoying a hegemonic societal position and 
claims have also been raised that the purpose of this drive is to promote domestic 
stability and as ruse in international affairs (Hauge, 1998:30) 
In giving a working definition of Nihonjinron (Nihonron, Nihonshakairon or 
Nihonbunkaron), it can be viewed as a discourse of cultural nationalism, concerned with 
propagating the view of Japanese uniqueness. It favours an anti-individualistic approach 
                                               
20 The average Japanese is a woman (51%), working in a small firm with less than 300 employees (78%), 
non-unionised (79%) and no university background, except perhaps from junior or technical collage 
(85%) (Sugimoto, 2003:2). Thus the average lifestyle and values of the Japanese people are more 
heterogeneous than might be suggested by many studies. In reality, generation, geography and socio-
economic factors are influential in generating different lifestyles, housing, eating habits, language 
(dialects), style of thinking and many other aspects of every day life (Sugimoto:60). 
21 Graduates from Japanese top universities, working in the government bureaucracy or large companies. 
 13 
 
and is hostile towards the notion of socio-historical diversity22 within Japan. Some of 
the underlying assumptions within the discourse are that the Japanese constitute a racial 
entity that is culturally and socially homogeneous, and that it has remained unchanged 
since primordial times. In addition, the Japanese are assumed to be radically unlike 
everyone else in social, cultural and linguistic terms, and that Japanese "blood" is 
essential for understanding. Thus foreigners do not have the capacity to fully understand 
the culture and language23 of the Japanese (Haugh, 1998:28). 
There is however also an assumption that through differentiating Japan from the 
West, one generates a key for unlocking the understanding of Japans political, economic 
and cultural actions. Differences are usually assumed to be in the moral and ethical 
attitudes of the two people (Pinnington, 2001:92), with there being a tendency to treat 
the West as a homogenous cultural unit; heterogeneous, multiracial and horizontal 
based on rights, guilt and individualism. Non-Western cultures like those in Africa are 
largely ignored (Hauge, 1998:38, Feldman, 1997:328, 330 and Buruman 1995). In 
regards to the distinction between shame (Japan) and guilt (West) culture, Pinnington 
(2001:98) write that ordinary Japanese people arguably has a strong sense of guilt, 
through the Buddhist teachings of karma, whilst the shame culture is described as a 
feature of bushi (samurai/warrior) culture alone (Pinnington, 2001:98, see also Buruman 
1995). 
Like in most nationalisms, the characteristics described by Nihonjinron as being 
primordial and timeless in Japan are recent invention, and sometimes even have their 
origins in other societies such as the West. Examples of central concepts that originate 
in the west include amae meanwhile the concept of wa (harmony) is arguably a quite 
recent development (Gjerde – Onishi, 2000:221f). Moreover, it is worth noting that the 
assumption of homogeneity goes hand in hand with the imagining of Japan as a very 
egalitarian and equal society (Sugimoto, 2003:4). 
All this being said, criticism has been levied against the genre from methodological, 
empirical and ideological grounds (Sugimoto, 2003:4). To name some examples it is 
unrealistic to claim that the Japanese form a homogeneous group, e.g. since the 
linguistic diversity of the Japanese. Some also point out the flourishing subcultures and 
differentiated groups that constitute contemporary Japan. In addition, race biological 
claims (like "biological culture genes") and assumptions about cultural tendencies being 
inherited are just wrong, considering the current knowledge about human genetics 
(Hauge, 1998:30 and Sugimoto 2003). But although its many flaws in regards to 
methodology and concepts, the Nihonjinron genre still retains popularity and influence 
(Sugimoto, 2003:4). 
                                               
22 Except for the 1,3 million foreign workers in Japan, minority groups also include Burakumin (2 
million), Resident Koreans (0,6 million) and Ainu (24000), as well as others, putting the estimate portion 
of ethnic and pseudo-ethnic minorities to around 3-6% within Japan (Sugimoto, 2003:185 and 7). 
23 One can note that native Japanese words (yamato kotoba), make up around half the Japanese lexicon, 
and even less so (36%) in commonly used vocabulary (Hauge, 1998:32). 
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2.4.2 Sociological Approach 
The group model represents the most explicit, coherent formulation and most influential 
framework for interpreting the Japanese and Japanese society. Three main lines of 
arguments on individual, interpersonal and inter-group level (Sugimoto, 2003:3). 
The Japanese individual is portrayed at a psychological level to lack a fully developed 
independent self or ego, with the concept of amae being one of the most notable claims 
for this. Amae refers to the supposed unique inclination of Japanese to seek emotional 
satisfaction by influencing and depending on superiors. In addition, group loyalty is 
placed as a primary value, and the need of explicitly demonstrate individuality is not felt 
as necessary. Furthermore, special satisfaction at a psychological level is also said to be 
felt when giving oneself to the realization and promotion of the goals of the group 
(Sugimoto, 2003:3).  
At interpersonal level, the Japanese are depicted as group oriented, and for instance 
is said to put great importance on intra-group harmony. The status within the group is 
dependent on membership length, and vertical loyalties are dominant, with strong ties 
being maintained and cultivated between superiors and inferiors. This is put in sharp 
contrast to the more horizontally orientated Western society. Between groups, harmony 
is achieved in such a way that Japan is described as a "consensus society". This makes 
the Japanese people easy to govern and lead, as well as mobilize for specific goals. Thus 
it's been said that this aspect of the Japanese have contributed to Japans economic 
growth after the pacific war. From a different angle one could also note that groups 
compete in loyalty thus making them conform to national goals as well as facilitate 
consensus (Sugimoto, 2003:3). 
2.4.3 Psychological approach 
There is a sea of examinations relating to the Japanese way of doing business, run 
politics, interact socially, think and so forth. Some researchers also put considerable 
time into uncovering the "hidden layers", "basic shape" or "archetypical" of Japanese 
society. These works tend to have four underlying assumptions. Firstly, that all 
Japanese share the trait in question, regardless of other variables (like income, education 
and upbringing). Secondly, that there is virtually no internal variation within the 
Japanese society in regards to the traits degree of manifestation within the individual 
(and thus society at large). The third assumption is that the traits only marginally exist 
in other societies (compared to the West in particular). Forth is the assumption that the 
traits have prevailed since (unspecified) ancient times (Sugimoto, 2003:3f). "It can be 
noted that psychological attributes presented in cultural identity psychology, as well as 
in the Nihonjinron literature, as uniquely Japanese (e.g., harmony, group-orientation, 
and empathy) are frequently outcomes of state-sponsored cultural ideologies" (Gjerde – 
Onishi,  2000:218). 
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2.4.4 Anthropological Approach 
Within the field of anthropology there are two concepts worth noting here: Emic and 
Etic. Emic concepts are those who are specifically culture bound and thus only 
meaningful to the members of a certain group. The etic concepts can be seen as the 
opposite, with concepts being applicable to people all over the world (Sugimoto, 
2003:22 and Haugh, 1998:28) 
With the dominance of western culture, many emic concepts within sociology 
originating in Europe or North America have become etic. In addition, the nihonjinron24 
discourse also lay claims to a wide range of concept perceived to be emic for Japan, 
however some studies also show that some of these concepts25 are actually found in 
higher levels in other western societies (Sugimoto, 2003:23). 
2.4.5 Institutional Approach 
Some scholars assert that theories on bureaucracy are culture bound. Western thought 
on the subject argues for its operation to be governed by universalistic law, formal 
criteria, and "functional specificity", and transcending particularistic interactions, 
affective considerations, and "functional diffuseness"26. These scholars also find that the 
Japanese form of bureaucracy is essentially non-western (or at least non-Weberian), 
arguing that the legal-rational model might not be the only one that leads to an efficient 
bureaucracy (Sugimoto, 2003:23f). 
In Japan large bureaucratic corporations paternalistic arrangements such as company 
housing, leisure facilities and excursions tend to be given priority. Time series surveys 
also show that employees prefers supervisors who are demanding at work, but take care 
of their welfare and are willing to listen to their personal problems. To this, managers 
are assumed to pay a lot of personal attention to their subordinates (even thou this is not 
mentioned in contracts), including after work excursions to pubs, bars and restaurants as 
well as being a formal go-between at weddings and attend funerals for their 
grandparents etc. (Sugimoto, 2003:23f) 
2.4.6 Linguistic Approach 
As in any language or culture there are certain concepts of indirectness, vagueness and 
ambiguity that are active. In Japan, there are a range of conceptual pairs that distinguish 
between the official ("sanitized") reality and hidden reality, and one should be vigilant 
in not confusing these two aspects. (Sugimoto, 2003:28) 
                                               
24 Hendry (2003:19) describes this discourse as cultural nationalism seen from an anthropological 
viewpoint. 
25 Feldman (1997:331) and Gjerde – Onishi (2000:221) lists a number of these common in nihonjinron. 
26 This is one reason why this western model sees nepotism as dysfunctional in formal organizations. 
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1.1.1.1. Tatemae-Honne 
Tatemae refers to the politically correct and formally established principles; this should 
not be confused with these principles being accepted or practiced. In stead, the Honne is 
the true feelings and desires; but usually suppressed due to the strength of the tatemae. 
An example could be lobbyists of Japanese rice farming with the tatemae aim of 
securing Japanese rice production for its cultural value to Japan, but with the honne of 
increasing profits for personal gains. (Sugimoto, 2003:28, Feldman, 1997:331, Hendry, 
2003:49f) 
1.1.1.2. Omote-Ura 
Omote (face side) represents the face of things – openly permissible. The Ura (back) on 
the other hand connotes to what is wrong, bad and concealed – regarded as publicly 
unacceptable or even illegal. One (of many) aspect(s) of this can be found in the 
business world where shito fumei kin (expenses unaccounted for) accounts are permitted 
as long as they are included for tax, and are used for secret payoffs, kickbacks and 
political donations, but also to a great deal to pay for entertainment (for the guests being 
paid off etc.). (Sugimoto, 2003:28, Hendry, 2003:50) 
1.1.1.3. Soto-Uchi 
The pairs of soto and uchi are used to distinguish between the in-group and the others 
outside. It is not uncommon for employees to referee to the company as uchi. Also, 
while a soto environment prohibits the discussion of sensitive subjects, an uchi 
environment can enable the break of confidentiality. For instance, an employee can 
show obedience towards her boss in the soto, but in the uchi harbour anger towards his 
arrogant behaviour (Sugimoto, 2003:28f, Feldman, 1997:331, Hendry, 2003:47ff). 
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3 Method 
The purpose of this essay is to increase the understanding of how foreign professionals, 
working with foreign relations to Japan, feel, perceive and relate to Japanese 
nationalism. This chapter aims to establish the method and methodology in order to 
achieve this purpose. The methodological goal thus becomes how to access the thoughts 
of informants in the chosen population.  
The first step is thus to decide what form of methodological approach one should 
use; quantitative or qualitative. Quantitative research includes surveys and experimental 
studies where one measures frequency and quantity. Qualitative research on the other 
hand, focuses on peoples' experiences, how they are felt and perceived (Sherman –  
Webb in Ely, 1993:11; Bryman, 1997:8). The approach that fits best with my purpose is 
thus the qualitative approach. 
3.1 Case study 
One strategy27 to conduct qualitative studies is case studies, which constitute an 
empirical examination of a special phenomenon within the context of real life, and can 
focus on an individual, or include several such individual cases (Yin, 2003:1, Robson 
1993:146). One or several local societies/communities, organisations or institutions can 
also be studied (Robson, 1993:147) 
In this study, the case study will be conducted on individuals that are working within 
the foreign diplomatic service in Tokyo, and my primary source will be made up of 
interviews (Yin, 2003:89ff). 
3.2 The Interview 
To find out, discover, understand and figure out the character or nature of foreign 
professional’s28 view on Japanese nationalism; my intention is to conduct 
qualitative interviews (Svensson-Starrin, 1996:53). An interview can be 
conducted in a variation of ways, from standardized and highly structured 
                                               
27 Examples of other strategies that are used within qualitative research include Grounded Theory 
(Hansemark, 2008) and socio-morphological method (Svensson-Starrin, 1996) , also see Yin (2003). 
28  Working within the foreign diplomatic community in Japan. 
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questioners, to unstructured conversation, with a middle road being the so called 
semi-structured interview, which I intend to use. 
The merit of using interviews is that they can be targeted and target the topic of the 
case, as well as give deeper insights into the perception of the informants. This said, one 
can also note however that like any other method, interviews also come with drawbacks 
such as bias due to poorly constructed questions29, response bias, the possible 
inaccuracies of informants memories, and informants trying to say the “right” thing 
(Yin, 2003:86, 89ff) 
3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews 
In a semi-structured interview some standardized question are used in order to retrieve 
information regarding for example age, gender, occupation, living conditions etcetera. 
Qualitative information about what is being studied is investigated through open 
question, with the informant clarifying and developing the answers that are given. This 
gives the interviewer greater opportunity to deepen the answers and enter into a 
dialogue with the informant (May, 2001:151). 
The open questions also enable the informant to answer the questions using his or her 
own words. The flow and depth is more important than actually answering the questions 
in a certain order (Aberbach – Rockman, 2002). As with all other forms of interviews 
the interviewer must be aware about the content in the interview as well as the 
interviews character and in what way the questions are being made (May, 2001:151). 
3.2.2 Elite interviews 
To interview a so called "elite" such as politicians putts special requirements on the 
possibility on gaining access (Werning Rivera – Kozyreva – Sarovskii, 2002), and there 
is an advantage in being able to leave at a moments notice and for the interview 
(Goldstein, 2002). One should seem professional and generally knowledgeable (but less 
knowledgeable than the respondent on the particular topic), and also appear friendly and 
curious (Leech. 2002). 
Some problems can also come up in certain question when the informant can speak 
in a way that promotes their own cause, which can lead to exaggerations of different 
kind, and thus flaw the objectivity in what is being said. This mustn't necessarily be a 
weakness however if the interviewees view on a certain subject, or similar is in focus 
for what one want to gain knowledge about (Berry, 2002). 
The interview can also branch out into areas one didn't predict, which can be 
positive, but also brings with it that the interview increases in extent (Berry, 2002) 
                                               
29 Quality assessment for the questions in the questions template (See Appendix A) was made in 
assistance with the tutor assigned by Lund University. 
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3.3 Questions Template 
The Questions Template can be found in Appendix A. The questions can be divided into 
three categories: Category questions, Main questions and support (i.e. bridging and 
follow-up) questions. The easy questions are planned to be placed in the beginning of 
the interview (Leech, 2002), these include taxiometric questions such as Age and 
Gender. The support questions are type examples of follow-up questions, and bridging-
questions in order to return to the main question, as well as other question that support 
the information gathering for the main questions. 
As mentioned above the purpose of this essay is to increase understanding of how 
foreign professionals, working with foreign relations to Japan, feel, perceive and relate 
to Japanese nationalism. The later made it important to ask the informant about his or 
her general perception about nationalism/patriotism as a phenomenon. This is the basis 
of how the main question is constructed, and what they aim to shed light on. ”What you 
know is as important as what you want to know”, since prior knowledge determines 
both questions and how they are asked (Leech, 2002). With a number of questions 
specifically related to the problem area intended to follow, with an open question to the 
informant if he of she would like to add something. 
3.4 Conducting the interviews 
Before the interviews, all European30 embassies were contacted in which the 
request of interviewing the ambassador or section heads was put forward31. A date 
was then set for the interview in coordination with the secretaries of the 
informants who were available during the time for the interviews32. The 
interviews were then conducted in the informant’s office, or meeting room, at the 
various embassies and recorded on microcassette. The informants were informed 
that they would be anonymous and not quoted by name. (During the interview 
sometimes with tea/coffee and biscuits which were accepted by myself in order to 
build a cooperative mood). 
The informants were free to answer the questions as they pleased and no 
pressure was put on them in any way to coerce them into giving any particular 
answer, although there were times when some informants seemed slightly weary 
of the microcassette recorder at first. 
 
                                               
30 European Union states. 
31 In most cases a written request was also sent informing who I was; that I wanted to interview them 
about their views on Japanese society, and that it was part of my University thesis. 
32 Mid to late December 2007 in Tokyo. 
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3.5 The informants 
A total of seven interviews were conducted out of which five (four men and one 
woman) will be analyzed. The remaining two interviews was not useful for the purpose 
of this study, because their work did not expose them enough to the Japanese in a 
professional role. The description of the five informants will be made using first person 
masculine, and their quotes will be subject to censorship in order to preserve their 
anonymity. The informants are summarized in Table 1. Further information could be 
found in the result section. 
 
# Level Section Time in Japan Work 
Experience 
Japanese33 
I1 Ambassador Chancellery 4+1.5 33 Basic 
I2 Ambassador Chancellery 430 30 Basic 
I3 Ambassador Chancellery 2 25 Basic 
I4 Deputy Head of Mission Chancellery 2 20 Basic 
I5 Section Head Economics 2.5 N/A Basic 
30 4 years since presenting credentials, but has been in Japan perhaps 20 times since the 1960’s 
Table 1 – Informants 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
33 Basic proficiency enables survival or non-fluent and limited communication  
(Japanese Language Proficiency Test, Level 4-3) 
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4 Result 
The purpose of this study is to see how foreigners, working with foreign relations to 
Japan, feel, perceive and relate to Japanese nationalism. For this purpose, five 
informants were selected from the European embassies in Tokyo. 
With the exception of informant I5 that worked as head of the economics section, the 
informants work at the chancellery level of the embassy. The purpose of this work is to 
promote its “national” interest of their home government, and to support different kind 
of relationship with Japan. In doing this work every informants have many different 
relations with their Japanese counterpart. Here, the informants are presented briefly. 
Information about each informant was also provided in the method chapter. 
I1 is active in Japan for the second time, this time as an Ambassador and has worked 
as a bureaucrat for more than 30 years. He has lived a total of five and a half years in 
Japan (one and a half as Ambassador) reaching Basic proficiency in Japanese. 
I2 presented his credentials four years ago, and is a non-professional diplomat, 
stating that Japan would be his “first and final posting”. He loves Kanji but only 
understands a little Japanese. 
I3 has been in Japan for two years and likes to go head on with the Japanese. He is an 
Ambassador and has worked within the field of foreign services for 25 years. 
I4 works as deputy head of mission and has been in Japan for two years out of a 
career of 20. Japanese proficiency is Basic. 
I5 heads the economics section in his embassy since two and a half years back. He 
has basic proficiency in Japanese. 
Illustrative examples from single informants are used to demonstrate the 
perceived experiences. 
4.1 The concepts 
The Concept of Nationalism had different meaning for the informants. A visible fault 
line could be noted, dividing the phenomenon into nationalism on the one hand, and 
culture and patriotism on the other. I have chosen to adopt the term “cultural 
nationalism” to symbolize the non-hot/non-right-wing/non-political part of nationalism 
that the informants have mainly associated with “Culture” and “Patriotism”. 
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4.1.1 Nationalism 
Nationalism was characterized as a political phenomenon, usually connected with right-
wing politics: “As an “ism”, yes I think it is essentially a right-wing phenomenon” (i1). 
One informant (I4) also finds it carrying connotations to National Socialism, which is 
regarded as giving nationalism a negative association. “it’s connected with National 
Socialism, so that’s why it has such a bad clung” (i4). 
Nationalism was also characterized as a form of egoism “nationalism for me is sort 
of an egoism”. (i5), promoting ones own country at the expense of others “nationalism, 
being proud of your country, being proud of what this country stands for, what this 
country has achieved” (i3), as well as seeing ones own country as superior “nationalism 
/../ it’s an relation to other nations, and in particular you put your own country above 
others” (i4), or at the very least as one side of the same coin as patriotism: Patriotic 
means to be a positive side of the nationalism (i2). 
4.1.2 Cultural Nationalism 
1.1.1.4. Patriotism 
When seeing a countryman perform well in a sporting event as well as certain symbols, 
a reference to patriotism is made. As informant I4 expresses his view, this has nothing 
to do with political nationalism, but instead a special relation to some distinctive 
characters of your country, things that makes a difference, such as nature, art and 
folklore. 
patriotism when you see a sport event and your countrymen doing fine ... I think you can be 
patriotic, love your own country [it’s nature, art and folklore] without any kind of politically 
motivated nationalism.(i4) 
Patriotism might be considered as a positive side of nationalism, and related to loving 
ones country and defending it (i2). 
Patriotic means to be a positive side of the nationalism. Everybody has to love his country, or her 
country, and to defend it, but that don’t have to be at the expense of hurting the other people. (i2) 
Certain emphasis is also placed on behavior and social codes are said to be part of 
patriotism, and patriotism being part of culture. The trustworthiness of nationals 
compared to foreigners has possible nationalistic connections with putting ones own 
group on a higher pedestal than the foreign groups. (i4) 
patriotism is, /../ that I love my country because it’s different, /../ some ways of behavior that we 
think is really, really important/../Russians aren’t as reliable as we are. So it can get close to, 
almost nationalism in that sense that you put yourself ahead of other/../ In that sense the social 
code[and culture] is part of patriotism (i4) 
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Patriotism was believed to be said out right in Abe’s beautiful Japan speeches, and his 
policy to promote love for Japan and patriotic education in school, as well as the idea 
that you have to work really hard for your country. (i4) 
what was clearly regarded as somehow patriotic and I believe it was said outright in Abe’s 
beautiful Japan speeches. He was promoting love for your own country and /../ the idea was that 
you have to really work for your country, and you have to educate your children, so that they learn 
to love their country, it’s patriotic education, but there was, very very, lively debate on it, /../ how 
can you give a mark at school for, hehehe, patriotism? /../ I don’t think it’s possible. (i4) 
1.1.1.5. Culture 
On the deeper end of nationalism, the emic concept of “culture” and “wisdom” is used. 
Culture is described as all (non-genetic) information that is inherited from one 
generation to another (i.e. all writings, all books, all beliefs, all materials made), which 
is also closely related to “wisdom” which gives us tools to evaluate the results of our 
actions: 
culture is religion, beliefs, the beliefs are very important part of a culture because it’s connected 
also with the behavior of the people, how they decide. ... wisdom is accumulated in beliefs, in 
religions [which are very basic fundamental cultures], in literature, poetry and, the wisdom is 
connected with the world beings of the humanity.(i2) 
Culture is also defined as activities preserving very old traditions and keeping the 
identity of a society and what the society stands for. Identity of a society is formed by 
certain building blocks within the culture that has been created/constructed over time. 
The building blocks are not the culture as such, but are the cultural expression of the 
society that is the main part of it. (i3) 
culture is the way in which your taking care of preserving your very old traditions, how really to 
keep the identity of a society and what the society stands for, /../ that have been 
created/constructed over many many years/centuries, /../ will form the identity of a society, and the 
identity of a society is /../ perhaps not the culture as such, but is the cultural expression of the 
society that is the main part of it (i3). 
Further, cultural identity and Nationalism form intrical parts when nationalism relates to 
being proud of ones country, what it stands for and what it have achieved. Love for ones 
culture is also expressed as a possibility, as is the increased meaning cultural artifacts 
and symbols can have for the members of the “group”. 
We all love our countries, we all stick to our culture and background /../ and traditions ... but it is 
not the same as you want to inflict or to dominate your neighbors or trying really to tell the 
outside world there is only one culture that counts. (i3) 
Love for ones culture is expressed in the use of cultural artefacts and symbols for the 
members of the “group”. The flag is described as one symbol, and to show its respect 
and honour is described as a natural form of behaviour (i3) 
I’m a member of the X Club, and every time I go there, and if I’m making a speech then you’ll 
have the Japanese flag and the X flag, every time they start with singing the national anthem of 
Japan, showing the respect for their flag and our flag, I think it’s a kind og natural behavior (i3). 
Symbols and artifacts can also be found in the arts, as well as in pop culture. 
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I believe it’s every part of culture, there’s also art, visual art, poetry, literature, [and humor] (i4). 
4.2 The perceived cultural nationalism of Japan 
I think the Japanese are very patriotic, very patriotic. (i2) 
4.2.1 The Political side of nationalism in Japan 
When looking at the political context, there has been a debate regarding if former Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe’s position was too nationalistic or right-wing, and there were 
linkages made between his behavior and his focus on the North Korean abduction issue. 
Inspiration for this position was seen as deriving from his nationalist view that damage 
had been done to the soul of Japan by North Korea in their abduction of a number of 
Japanese citizens. (i3) 
Of course, if you look into the political context there’ve been a lot back and forth as to for instance 
Shinzo Abe-san’s position was he to nationalistic or too right-ist and so forth and there was made 
a link between his behavior and the fact that he was really putting the only focus on solving this 
abduction issue with North Korea /../ inspired or promoted by his nationalistic views in the sense 
that North Korea inflict a kind of damage to the, to Japan, the soul of Japan by abducting a 
number of citizens (i3) 
The most vocal group for resurgence in militarism can be found in the right-wing 
people associated with the “black cars”/“sound trucks” that have declined over the 
years. These views are however very seldom, if at all, mirrored by the rest of the 
population. Further, militarism should be interpreted in the context of when it was 
materialized, which today is totally different from the 1930’s and 40’s. (i3) 
but if you mean nationalistic in the sense of a kind of revival of militaristic attitudes, then I don’t 
think it’s, I’ve never met that in Japan, and I’ve been traveling a lot in Japan, of course you can 
see that the right-ist and the nationalist screaming every weekend in Shibuya and so forth, but 
when talking with people I think it’s very seldom that they’ll come up with, let’s say comments or 
statements that could be described as being nationalistic in the since of going back to the “good 
ol’ days” of Japan. ... Militarism, I mean what happened to, in the 30’s, what the Imperial Army 
did, what happened during the second world war, that was the most brutal form of militarism. /../ 
Because it was used really to dominate the neighbouring countries in the whole region. (i3) 
In the last 20 years the phenomenon of (black) sound trucks have declined in presence 
quite noticeably and are now not as common, and the far-right isn’t  seen as much 
stronger in Japan, than in for instance France and Germany, with the “old guard” 
making a last stand. (i1) 
You used to have a sort of a column, the military word is not exaggerated, you would have a 
column of ‘sound trucks’, maybe 6, 8, 10 of them, blaring music, driving around with great ‘rising 
sun flags’, shouting “Banzai”, “tennōhēka banzai”34 and so forth. I haven’t seen that since I came 
back, it was a common sight 20 years ago. ... I think the far-right elements in Japan are no 
                                               
34 天皇(n) Emperor of Japan, 万歳(n) banzai (a celebratory cheer); hurrah; (lit. 10 000 years). 
Own translation: “long live the Emperor” 
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stronger today than in France, than in Germany, just to take those two. ... Yes, I would defiantly 
see it like that[, the old guard making a last stand]. /../ these are yesterday’s debates ... and 
today’s people are not very interested.(i1) 
The experience of two nuclear attacks has changed the mindset of people in Japan 
which is by nature a very pacifistic country. (i3) 
Japan is the only country who has experience the suffering from the atomic bombs, and I think that 
has changed really the mindset of people in, and Japan is by nature a very pacifistic country, (i3) 
According to informant I3 a lot of people are, particularly in the media, exaggerating 
and trying to make Japan look really nationalistic or even militaristic as exemplified 
with the debate surrounding the educational reform. (i3) 
I think a lot of people are trying to describe Japan as being really nationalistic even militaristic 
and there was also this... part on education, there were a huge debate on patriotic part of it and I 
think it was exaggerated, a lot, in the media. (i3) 
The Abe administration, which used a clearly patriotic rhetoric, failed in implementing 
some of the reforms aimed at making Japan a prouder and more independent country. 
(i1) 
Abe tried to mobilize that lobby really in support of reform of the constitution, reform of the 
education system ... you know, a prouder and more independent Japan, he got nowhere. Why did 
he get nowhere? nobody’s interested, it’s not necessarily more international, they’re just less 
national. (i1) 
4.2.2 Views on Japanese cultural nationalism 
Many Japanese from the establishment have had a high exposure to the world outside 
Japan, and are perceived as very internationalized, not only in regards to behavior, but 
also their curiosity in what goes on outside Japan and how this can benefit Japan. 
However, it is felt that Japan has a certain paralysis in viewing the US as it’s only Ally. 
Also, Japan is seen as a economic superpower, but it is also seen as being quite limited 
in its ability to transform this economic power to political power. 
Extremely many Japanese from the establishment have kind of education background from United 
States mainly, Many of them are capable of speaking English and you can have a free discussion 
with them, they are very open minded and they are also very internationalized, not only in their 
behavior but also in let’s say their curiosity about what’s happening in the world outside of Japan, 
and how Japan really can benefit from the strengths that Japan has. ... On the other hand, all 
other countries are just described as kind of partners, and friends and so forth, and I think Japan 
has been to some extent paralyzed by this notion that they have only one ally [the US] ... Japan is 
a kind of economic superpower, but they are very bad at well transferring this economic power, /../ 
[into a] kind of political critical mass /../ [so] their influence on global politics is very limited. (i3) 
When looking at Japanese organizations, especially companies, the importance of 
hierarchy is further reinforced since they are built around a “goat”. This “goat” 
embodies the spiritual head of the company and its philosophy, or “wisdom”, which the 
company follows (i2) 
Japanese society is completely different from the societies in Europe and... In Japanese society 
there’s a structure, top-down structure, which you see very clear in the big companies, the big 
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companies are built around a goat, [What he says, that’s it.] ... this business was connected to 
some philosophy, some wisdom. /../they follow a philosophy, (i2) 
Informant I1 connects this to a Confucian approach to life (Japan is supposed to be half 
Buddhist and half Shinto). 
their value system, although they’re supposed to be half Buddhist, half Shinto, I find that their 
approach to life is largely Confucian; hierarchical and family based, and respect based. (i1) 
As informant I3 points out, these general images are, to some extent, constructed by the 
Japanese themselves, as a means of gaining the upper hand or protection. 
to some extent [Japaneseness,]it’s been constructed by the Japanese themselves because they 
wanted to protect themselves, and really create kind of an advantage (i3) 
Historically, support has been centered in and around the family, which still is the case 
for most part, with loyalty centered around the company; this is however in both cases 
in decline according to informant I1. 
You know as I’ve said, honesty, very much family based support systems still, company based 
loyalty system but that’s breaking down obviously with the decline in lifetime employment. (i1) 
This being said, Informant I3 perceives the general image (stereotype) created by 
foreigners to characterize the Japanese – “Japaneseness” – which he was influenced by 
when he came to Japan, is by far not correct. 
I realized this general image is by far not really correct description of Japan (i3) 
1.1.1.6. The Island Country Concept 
Except the importance of hierarchy, all the informants stated that the Japanese had a sort 
of “island mentality”, generated by Japan being isolated as an island; thus feeling 
separated from the outside world. It is also noted that being on an island makes it easier 
to maintain ‘their own society’ and keep unwanted influences out, something that they 
see as important (i5). 
[A] sort of island psychology, which is also noted in European integration for example the British. 
It gives you a reflex, that fact you are separated from others, and enables you to maintain things 
separately from, border controls, you think when you’re on an island are relatively safe to keep 
things outside, whether it’s [raiders] or illegal immigrants or whatever. (i5) 
This island mentality and the relative isolation that Japan enjoys, especially when taking 
local initiatives into consideration, positions Japan in an angle to be seen as perhaps the 
best country when it comes to protecting and sustaining some very old traditions; and 
even in areas that are highly westernized, like Tokyo, one can find people eagerly 
engaged in conservation activities relating to the culture of Japan (i3). 
Japan is perhaps the only country, or perhaps the country who is best at protecting, keeping alive 
some very old traditions. ... and you will find a lot of activities in Tokyo in other parts of Japan 
where people are eagerly conserving old traditions that would be, that form the culture of Japan. 
(i3) 
Japan being isolated as an island referred to as “the island country concept” is also said 
to be connected with Japan being a very homogenous country, introvert and weary of 
foreigners. This is seen as a more deep-seated cultural phenomenon rather than 
nationalism. 
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Japan is still a “Shimaguni”, it’s still an island country, very much a racially and ethnically 
homogenous society, still weary of foreigners and rather introverted, little bit xenophobic if you 
like, so there is that, not ... quite the same as nationalism, it’s more something culturally very very 
deep-seated in Japan. (i1) 
Also, it is thought that the Japanese are afraid of the outside world, and even though 
they like to go there, they are seen to be quite happy with having a uniform society with 
few foreigners according to I2. 
the Japanese are in some way very happy that they are very uniform society. They don’t have so 
many foreigners here. (i2) 
This isolation and being afraid of the outside world have implications for foreigners 
working in Japan. The very tough attitude towards immigration and the shortage of 
labor is also noted as Japan is inclined to make up for the labor shortage, caused by its 
aging society, with high-technology (i3). 
[They’re very tough on immigration], and instead they have developed this idea of using modern 
technology or high technology rather to take over some of the tasks that a society with a shrinking 
population will face, and to some extent they might be more nationalistic about this issue (i3) 
However, there is some disagreement regarding the level of homogeneity of Japanese 
society. One informant (i1) express an opinion of the Japanese as being a very uniform 
and homogenous group, whilst informant I3 describes this as a myth, with the Japanese 
society exhibiting a huge difference between people of different regions, cities and city 
wards all around the country. 
I think there are many many myths about Japan and Japanese, /../ that Japan is very inward 
looking country, Japanese do not really speak English and they are not interested in what’s going 
on outside of their own country, they are very, it takes years to get a decision because they have to 
really to attain this consensus and nobody want to lose face and so forth. (i3) 
Individualism is on the rise, and individual, personal and differing opinions have today 
reached a level almost unknown in the last two decades, thus Japan is becoming less 
homogenous (i1). 
There is far more individualism, expression of individual, personal, private opinions, expressions 
of differing opinions from the group and so forth, that was almost unknown 23 years ago. ... So it’s 
a less homogenous society, more normal society in that sense. (i1) 
1.1.1.7. Individual Characteristics 
The Japanese people are regarded as very polite: “Japanese are very polite people” 
(i2), even to the point where one can spend an hour or more in a meeting just saying 
polite words: “They can spend an hour without saying anything just polite words and so 
forth” (i3). The Japanese are perceived as being very honest: “on the whole the 
Japanese are incredibly honest, this is the only country that I know where people save 
their seats using their handbags, and you can” (i1), with a deep sense of duty: 
“Japanese are very reliable, in the sense that they have this very deep sense of duty, if 
they say they will do something they will do it” (i4). A strong trait with the Japanese is 
that they never exaggerate, except for perhaps modesty: “A very strong trait in the 
Japanese, they are not nonchalant, they take issues seriously, and they never exaggerate 
for instance. “The only thing they would exaggerate is modesty” (i4). They don’t really 
show their emotions easily, which makes it hard for others to know what they really 
think, and they do not act aggressively. 
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they don’t really, show their emotions very easily, they always make the you know, the opponent somehow 
feel comfortable, so, it may be difficult to know what they really think ... They don’t, act aggressively [either] 
(i4) 
It is emphasized by informant I2 that the Japanese use the notion of “Wisdom” more 
than westerners, and that the Japanese people are very wise, something that is seen as 
the fundamental thing of Japanese culture (i2). 
But, one thing I like to emphasize about Japan is that they use a special notion, which is not so 
widely used in Europe and United States, is the notion ‘Wisdom’. ... I think that Japanese, Japan is 
very wise, the people are very wise ... This is, this, the fundamental, this is the Japanese culture 
(i2) 
1.1.1.8. Japanese 
The Japanese language has some peculiarities, and using the Japanese language itself, 
one has to take into consideration the social standing/hierarchical order between the 
people conversing, which according to informant I2 makes for a very stable top-down 
structure. 
look to the people above them and you see even their language needs to, if you talk to somebody else you 
have to define who is above, who is bellow. And this makes the structure very stable because it’s top-down. 
(i2) 
Further, the language is also seen as a barrier to communication because the risk of 
misunderstanding, which always means loss of face, and because of this things must be 
carefully prepared in order to avoid misunderstandings, which causes surprise, and 
surprise is loss of face. This language barrier is seen not only to affect interaction 
between foreigners and the Japanese, but also interaction amongst the Japanese as well 
(i1) 
Misunderstanding is a very, you know, in English or European languages, it’s just a word. In 
Japanese culture it’s a nightmare, because it happens all the time, and it always means loss of 
face, because things must be carefully prepared, so there must be no misunderstanding, because 
misunderstanding causes surprise, and surprise is loss of face. So I think the Japanese language is 
a huge barrier to communication by foreigners, but it is also a significant barrier to 
communication among Japanese themselves and for Japanese with foreigners. (i1) 
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4.3 Japan cultural nationalism and foreigners decisions 
In a more practical sense, that is, how Japanese nationalism might influence the 
relations with other countries, all the informants stated that it did not affect government 
to government decision-making and the way they conducted their business with their 
counterparts in Japan. 
No. No not at all, certainly not at a government to government level or interacting with ministries, 
not at all. (i1) 
Although the informants seemed to agree about that Japanese nationalism does not 
influence decision-making, they are not totally committed to the idée. As informant I5 
seemed to indicate, there is a but. The “Island concept” could influence the relations.  
you don’t encounter nationalistic flows in dialogues on the surface but.. of course Japanese is very 
much an island, psychologically, which makes them a bit less influential to foreign incentives in 
policy making than we would like perhaps. (i5) 
And informant I4 believes that there seems to be a certain, to some degree hidden, 
Japanese nationalistic flow running in the interactions with the Japanese. Informant I4 
also point out a difference in attitude that could be existing in international relation 
between Japanese and other countries as he suggest that the Japanese could have a more 
“patronizing” attitude towards its Asian neighbors. 
I’m sure it [nationalism] exists to some degree [when interacting with my Japanese counterparts], 
but it’s pretty hidden. /../ I think Japanese still they respect Europeans /../. If I were Chinese, I 
might have a different experience, I believe so. So I guess /../ I do think the Japanese have this kind 
of thinking. I do think that they have a really got patronizing, attitude towards some of their Asian 
neighbors. But, we don’t experience it because we come from Europe. (i4) 
In one way it is noticed by informant I5 that the people diplomats meet are part of a 
relatively small elite with a higher degree of exposure to, or education in, the outside 
world, they cannot be taken as an average man or woman of the people of Japan.  
But the people that we meet as professional diplomats, /../ are not the average Japanese. So what 
we meet is a small, relatively small elite group that has been relatively more open, or more 
educated to be open to the outside world, many of them have even stayed abroad /../. And so, I 
cannot take the people I meet as reflection of Japan. We only scratch at the outside. (i5) 
In the practical relation with Japan here are a few things to consider. As everything has 
to be very clear about what has been said and what should be done, the government 
interaction tends to be very slow and labor intensive, in order to get a deal. But the 
upside is that when the deal is reached everybody involved know about it and 
everybody should be united and the Japanese will deliver. But as informant I1 also point 
out, they will deliver to their understanding, so it is very important for the other side to 
be clear of the meaning of the deal. 
 everything tends to be rather slow and painstaking and inch by inch, and everything has to be 
said ten times, and checked ten times because that’s just the way Japan works, “nemawashi”35, the 
result of the Japanese need always to have everybody onboard before they do something... you 
need to prepare something very carefully and make sure that everybody is onboard before you do 
                                               
35 根回し (n, Suru-v) - ”Making necessary arrangements”; “laying the groundwork” 
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it, that’s the downside. The upside is that when you get a deal you got a deal, at least at the public 
level, I’m not sure the private sector quite the same experience, but certainly in government to 
government...but when you get there, the Japanese will always deliver, but they will deliver to 
their understanding of the letter, so if you’ve understood something, that the deal meant something 
else, then of course you may be disappointed. (i1) 
According to one informant I3, Japan is very much a networking society, and the 
importance of being accepted into the right networks is crucial in order to have many 
doors; the right doors, open up to you. At the same time, the artifacts and codes 
constituting Japaneseness is likened to a kind of package wrapping; something that 
should be put aside, especially if you want to gain influence. Then you have to focus 
and go to the core of things and not get distracted by the things that surrounds it. 
[Japan is] a networking society. And if you are accepted in the, the right networks, then a lot of 
doors will be open … [Japaneseness,] It’s kind of a wrapping,/../ I’m interested in influence,/../ 
you really really have to put aside all the wrapping,/../ if you want to influence, then you really 
have to go, really to the core. (i3) 
As for respecting the Japanese and their ways in discussions, informant I4 underlines 
that social codes and local customs has to be taken into consideration when dealing with 
the Japanese, something that can also have practical aspects such as being ready in time 
(i4). 
we have to take [the social codes of a country where we are working] that into consideration, we 
have to respect the local customs. /../ For instance, Japanese people are always on time. They 
actually /../ may be half an hour earlier so this means we have to be ready at least 30 minutes 
before the event starts, this is a very practical kind of example, but of course you learn this kind of 
things very quickly, you know, for instance, the courtesy in all kind of communication ... after 
being here for three years then you get so used to it you don’t even notice it anymore (i4) 
In sharp contrast to this another informant I3, did not feel any necessity for this, and it 
was expressed that the Japanese counterparts could easily be challenged, something 
even seen as being a moral obligation of foreigners. 
in my, let’s say discussions with my Japanese counterparts, I would never really try [to] /../ 
respect the Japanese. (i3) ... we can easily challenge Japanese businesspeople, politicians, 
ordinary people if you want to, and I think it’s our obligation to them. (i3) 
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Support for the research question 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to describe how foreign professionals, working with 
foreign relations to Japan, feel, perceive and relate to Japanese [cultural] nationalism. A 
phenomenological method was used, which allowed the informants experiences to be 
discovered. 
The result revealed that the informants tended to perceive the concepts in quite an 
orthodox way; as a political movement, mainly associated with right-wing groups, and 
relate to Billig (1995) description of the words definition in many other theoretical 
approaches. However, with the intended meaning of the word nationalism as used in the 
theory of banal nationalism; it is thus not misguiding to use the term nationalism for the 
excited state that nationals sometime assume, and further use another word to describe 
the less excited state that nationals assume when going on with their daily lives and 
being exposed to the banal forms of influence that cultural nationalism use in order to 
survive and guarantee its existence as a big narrow code system, with passionate 
nationalism being a narrow code system within it (Fiske, 1990). 
In one respect, the (Black) Sound trucks referred to by informants can be seen as 
symbols and agents for plain nationalism, in another respect, they can also be seen as a 
symbol of the sub-culture that nationalism can be seen as in relation to the cultural 
nationalism in which it is contained (Fiske, 1990). As informants noted, there had been 
a decrease in the amount of (Black) Sound trucks and that the current “flare” of 
nationalist activity could be considered as an action by the “old guard”. If these so 
called “old guards” have actually been exposed to imperial propaganda during their 
upbringing, this might be a sign that the residual effects of these information campaigns 
are diminishing in influence (through the reduction of agents propagating the associated 
meme36 and thus putting pressure on the remaining carriers to intensify their efforts), 
one should also take into account that popular culture as a medium for plain 
nationalistic propagation is increasing (Sasada, 2006), which can have an affect on its 
propagation efficiency (Fiske 1990) 
As the result indicates, “The Island Country Concept” was important in the 
informant’s perception of Japan and the Japanese, with the main characteristics being 
seen as ‘homogeneity’. In one way one can connect this to the stereotyping of 
geographical territory into “homelands” (Özkirimli 2000:200f). The most notable is also 
the way in which Nihonjinron propagates this stereotype of Japan as being a very 
homogenous society. Thus, this stereotype can make people think that their own, or 
another, group is more separate than they really are. 
                                               
36 A mental artifacts or ideas like fashion, catch-phrases and Moores law 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evolution-cultural/ 2008-05-15). 
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Not all informants agree with this view of Japan as a homogenous society however, 
and as noted in the result individualism is perceived to be rising, which could indicate 
that the Japanese are exposed to ideas from societies with a high degree of 
individualism. 
It was also said that there were many myths surrounding Japan, including the notion 
that Japan is isolationist. The concept of myth (Fiske, 1990) does suit the stereotypes 
and ideas especially if propagated by Nihonjinron since people from the society’s elite 
is active in propagating them as common sense, thus influencing the behaviour of the 
Japanese (Hauge, 1998). However, being introvert and weary of the outside world and 
foreigners, as well as being quite happy with having few foreigners within the country 
might not necessarily be a phenomenon that is unique to Japan, even if it were to be a 
deep-seated cultural phenomenon37. 
As put forth in the results, the behaviour associated with country flags is perceived as 
natural. Billig (1995) the symbol that a flag constitute is important for a nationalism, 
and as Fiske (1990) also notes that the flag has the ability to activate myths, and that 
myths are the product of dominant groups within society, and that their origins, 
something that is also reiterated by Haugh (1998) in reference to Nihonjinron. 
The informants does seem to have accepted some of the tenants of Nihonjinron, with 
one exception who showed some resistance to this type of “wrapping”. Amongst the 
other informants, there is a consensus that the Japanese are a very homogenous group, 
something which is quite unrealistic, especially when taking the numerous sub-cultures 
of both national and non-national nature into consideration (Haugh, 1998; Sugimoto, 
2003).  
Informant also notes, like Haugh (1998) that some of the things that can be seen as 
“Japaneseness”, are in fact ideas spread in order to give the Japanese an upper hand. 
What the informant referees to specifically isn’t clear, but if various aspects of 
Nihonjinron is taken as natural (or common sense), then this will play into the person 
exposed to adjust his actions appropriately, something that can give the Japanese (elite) 
an upper hand. 
Reference to the emic concept of nemawashi that: “when you get a deal you got a 
deal”. In one sense this can be connected to what some scholars argue regarding culture 
bound bureaucracy (Sugimoto, 2003). However, nemawashi also affects decision-
making in the sense that one has to take into consideration that the things that are 
decided on with the Japanese can get implemented fairly quickly, even though the initial 
part of the process does take a considerably longer time than might be expected; when 
the Japanese organization is prepared for implementation of the decision. 
One interesting point was bought forward in the result relating to the way in which 
the “others” are portrayed. The Japanese as such were divided into two categories: the 
population at large, comprising of people who the informants didn’t have professional 
contacts with and the establishment, which constituted the counterparts of professional 
interaction.  
The establishment is differentiated and said to be more or less on an equal footing 
with the informant’s primary group and not very different since a large part of it is 
perceived to have an educational background in the west, whereas the population at 
large are more “Japanese”. A possible theoretical explanation to this could be that the 
                                               
37  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4671687.stm (2008-05-25 04:09)  
   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3708098.stm (2008-05-25 04:17) 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7014960.stm (2008-05-25 04:30) 
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informants and their Japanese counterparts in the establishment share a form of 
community as a result of shared experiences such as academic schooling and increased 
exposure to the outside world (Anderson, 2003), which in turn results in behavior, 
language and rituals that further reinforces this sense of community (Billig, 1995). 
This sense of community does not seem to be present between Japanese and other 
Asian diplomats according to informants who points out the patronizing manner in 
which the Japanese behave towards their Asian neighbors, which is to some sense also 
noted by Rose (2000). A possibility to explain this might be the (power) symbology of 
Japan being the most prosperous and advanced country in the region, in which case 
economic factors play a role in generating a banal nationalism that elevates the Japanese 
over their economically inferior neighbors 
Similarly, in a way, is the way in which Japan is portrayed as an above average 
hierarchical society, even in the Japanese language itself, by several informants which 
also correlates with findings of sociological approaches when studying Japan 
(Sugimoto, 2003). 
Further references to the Japanese language are made, noting that there is much 
structural room for misunderstandings due to the way in which Japanese (language) is 
constructed. This is also highlighted by Sugimoto (2003), who points out that there are 
certain concepts of indirectness, vagueness and ambiguity active in any language or 
culture. 
Noted is also that the Japanese tend to refrain from showing their emotions, 
something that can be associated to the different linguistic aspects described by 
Sugimoto (2003), Feldman (1997) and Hendry (2003).  
As the results show, no informant felt that nationalism affected decision-making. It is 
stated however that nationalism can be lurking under the surface of things when the 
informants are interacting with their Japanese counterparts, but it is something that is 
said to be concealed to some degree. 
However, cultural nationalism does seem to play a role in influencing the way 
decisions are made by the informants, even though the small elite which diplomats 
usually meet have a higher degree of international exposure. 
One thing that is stated is the way in which language has to be used in such a way 
that misunderstandings are eliminated, something that can take considerable time since 
things can have to be stated very clearly, perhaps several times. 
As the results show, there is a slight fault line in regards to how one should approach 
the Japanese when working with them. One view echoes the proverb: “When in Rome, 
do as the Romans do”, and that one should take into consideration the cultural aspects 
of the society in which one is a minority, and in essence reduce friction. Another is that 
there is a moral obligation of foreigners to challenge the Japanese. The later of these 
views can in some way say to counter the efforts of elites and other propagators of 
Nihonjinron through myths and ideas relating to the Japanese. However, Japan being 
the networking society that it is said to be, there might be aspects of Japanese cultural 
nationalism that one cannot escape, even when taking active steps to counter them. 
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5.2 Limitations 
The result of this study cannot be generalized since it examines how individuals 
experience the concept of nationalism and its implications; which could be seen as a 
limitation. 
It is also a drawback that this study failed to give an answer to some of the initial 
questions raised in the introduction. 
The waste of the two interviews that were conducted but not used could also be 
considered a limitation. 
5.3 Recommendations for further research 
A statistical study of the same phenomenon might be of interest, as to similar studies 
carried out in other capitals and/or with different groups not necessarily belonging to 
elites such as the diplomatic communities in capital cities. 
Of special interest might also be to study what foreigners from neighboring countries 
to Japan, as well as people from other Asian or non western countries feel, perceive and 
relate to Japanese [cultural] nationalism. 
5.4 Result Summary 
The purpose of this paper was to increase understanding of how foreign professionals 
within the diplomatic sector, working with foreign relations to Japan, feel, perceive and 
relate to Japanese nationalism.  
The most relevant finding in the result show that the informants interpreted the word 
‘nationalism’ to represent a political ideology, usually right-wing (although left-wing 
was mentioned), that strived to promote ones own country at the expense of others, or at 
the very least seeing it as superior. The informants views on Japanese society and 
culture (cultural nationalism) showed them viewing Japan as a hierarchical society with 
honest individuals; very much influenced by an “island country mentality”, with the 
main characteristics being seen as ‘homogeneity’ and ‘isolationism’; though it was also 
argued that this might be considered myth or changing as well. 
The results also showed that the informants did not see their decision-making 
influenced by Japanese nationalism. However, it was uncovered that some influence 
was excreted on the informant’s decisions via cultural nationalism. 
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7 Appendixes 
The following appendixes are to be found in the pages that follow: 
 
 Appendix A – Interview Questions Template 
 Appendix B – Informant Summary
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7.1 Appendix A – Interview Questions Template 
Things to inform about before the 
interview: 
• Thanks for their time 
• Anonymity 
• Audio recording 
• Possibility of reading written 
transcript of interview (if there 
is time) 
 
Basic follow-up questions 
• In what way? 
• Could you give an example? 
• Could you elaborate on that? 
 
Category Questions  
(Avoid direct questioning) 
• Age/Sex 
• Education 
• Work description (question 2) 
• Current work desc. (duration) 
• Time in Japan (question 2) 
• Japanese language skills 
 
Bridging questions 
• You said before... 
• Regarding what you just said.. 
• Previously you stated that… 
Main questions 
 
1. Could you start with telling me a little about yourself, your education and 
background? 
2. Could you describe your work here in Tokyo/Japan, what do you do, and 
how long have you been here? 
3. What did you do before you came to Tokyo/Japan? 
4. Could you tell me about any negotiations/dialogues with Japanese 
representatives, and where you participated? How did it proceed and who 
participated? 
5. What were the results of the dialogue? Positive/negative? Why? 
6. Do you regard it as having been any special nationalistic flows in the 
dialogue? (Japanese or "European"?) 
7. Can you tell me about any other negotiation/discussion where there were 
specific Japanese nationalistic aspects involved in the dialogue? 
8. How do you perceive Japanese nationalism/patriotism (previous and 
present) 
9. How would you describe your concept of nationalism? (positive or negative) 
10. Generally speaking, can you see situation within your field of work where 
nationalistic flows have an influence, not just from a Japanese point of view. 
11. Is there anything you would like to add?  
 (Especially regarding nationalistic influences in, or on politics.) 
12. Could you give recommendations of whom (within your line of work) I 
should speak with that might have information on these issues? 
 
 
Be prepared to explain what you are asking about, without being to theoretical. 
Clarifications about i.e. nationalism could surface. 
 2 
 
7.2 Appendix B – Informant Summary 
# Level Section Time in Japan Work 
Experience 
Japanese38 
I1 Ambassador Chancellery 4+1.5 33 Basic 
I2 Ambassador Chancellery 437 37 Basic 
I3 Ambassador Chancellery 2 25 Basic 
I4 Deputy Head of Mission Chancellery 2 20 Basic 
I5 Section Head Economics 2.5 N/A Basic 
37 4 years since presenting credentials, but has been in Japan perhaps 20 times since the 1960’s 
 
                                               
38 Basic proficiency enables survival or non-fluent and limited communication  
(Japanese Language Proficiency Test, Level 4-3) 
